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T. RICHINS, RAY P. DYRENG, LYNN S. 
RICHARDS, DR. WELLS T. BROCKBANK, 
WILLIAM C. JENSEN, A. L. ELMER, mem-
bers thereof, and E. ALLEN BATEMAN, ex-
ecutive officer thereof and Superintendent of 
Plaintiffs, 
_ -vs.-
COMMISSION OF FINANCE and P. H. 
MULCAHY, TRUMAN S. CURTIS, and 
MILTON B. TAYLOR, members thereof, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS 
Case No. 
7785 
The 28th Legislature (Regular Session, 1949) adopt-
ed two Joint Resolutions proposing constitutional amend-
ments (1) to Article X, Section 8, and (2) to Article VII, 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sections 1, 10 and 20, Laws of Utah, 1949, pages 296· and 
297. These proposed constitutional amendments were 
voted upon, and adopted, by the people at the general 
election in 1950. 
Prior to its amendment Article. X, Section 8, of the 
Utah Constitution provided: 
The general control and supervision of the 
Public School System shall be vested in a State 
Board of Education, consisting of the Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction; and such other per-
sons as the Legislature may provide. 
As amended said section now provides : 
The general control and supervision of the 
public school system shall be vested in a State 
Board of Education the members of which shall be 
elected as provided by law. 
The Board shall appoint the State Superin-. 
tendent of Public Instruction who shall be the ex· 
ecutive officer of the Board. 
By the amendments to Article VII the. Constitution 
was changed (a) to delete the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction from the list of elective officers constituting 
the Executive Department as set out in Section 1 there-
of, (b) to delete the office of Superintendent of Public 
Instruction from the list of Executive Department of-
fices named in Section 10 thereof where it is provided 
that in the event of vacancy in such offices by death, 
resignation or otherwise the Governor shall fill the same 
by ap.pointment, and (c) to delete the office of Super-
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intendent of Public Instruction fro1n those named in 
Section 20 thereof, ·w·hich provides that officers of the 
Executive Depart1nent, and other state and district of-
fices provided for by la,v, shall receive for their services 
monthly a compensation as fixed by law. 
The Joint Resolution proposing the amendment to 
~~rticle X did not specifically provide for an effective 
date for that an1endment. The Joint Resolution propos-
ing the runendn1ents to sections in Article VII, however, 
provided that •'if adopted by the electors ·of the State, 
this runendment shall take effect the first day of January, 
1951." 
In the Regular Session of the 29th Legislature 
(1951) several bills were introduced to implement the 
approved constitutional amendment to Article X, Section 
8~ (H!B. No. 195, H.B~ No. 221 and H.B. No. 222; S.B_ 
No. 185, S.B. No 186, S.B. No. 221, and S.B. No. 222). 
None of the bills, however, was passed. When the, Legis-
lature met in Special Session in June, 1951, the GOivern.or 
called attention to the failure to p·ass implementing legis-
lation in the Regular Session and ·adde.d to the agenda 
of the Special Session the matter of considerjng S'Uch 
legislation. Three bills were introduced in ·the Special 
. Session, H. B. No. 9 and S.B. Nos. 10 and 11. H~B. No. 
9, as amended, was enacted and is now Chapter 16, Laws 
of Utah, 1951, First Special Session. S.B. No. 10 was 
· passed and is now Chapter 17, Laws of Utah, 1951, First 
Special S.ession. S.B. No. 11 did not p·ass. 
The Special Session of the Legislature adjourned 
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June 16, 1951. In accordance with Article VI, Section 
25 of the Utah Constitution, the statutes passed during 
the Special ·Session became e.ffective August 15, 1951. 
Unde·r date of July 28, 1951 the Chairman of the State 
Board of Education asked the Attorney General of Utah 
for his opinion upon three questions : ( 1) Is it nece:Ssary 
that an election for a member of the Board of Education 
be held in Regional District No.7 in 1951 ~ (2) Does the 
State Board of Education have authority to appoint a 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction as soon as 
the law becomes effective~ (3) Does the present State 
Superintendent have the right to continue in office until 
his elected term expires~ In an opinion dated September 
6, 1951 the Attorney General answered (1) that in his 
opinion no election should be held in 1951 in Regional 
District 7, (2) that in his opinion the Board of Education 
was then authorized to appoint the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, and (3) that the term to which the 
Superintendent was elected in 1948 had been shortened 
and that he was not entitled--as a matter of right to com-
plete that term. At the meeting of the State Board of 
Education held September 7, 1951, the following motion 
was adopted: 
Inasmuch as copies of the opinion requested 
by the Chairman of the State Board of Education 
from the Attorney General have not come to the 
attention of membe.rs of the Bo·ard until today, 
and inasmuch as all members of the Board are not 
pr~sent at today's meetings~ the Board postpones 
action on permanent ap·pomtment of the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction until the 
members have had opportunity to study possible 
• 8 
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implications of the opinion and op·portunity for a 
Ineeting to be held '"'ith a full membership· of the 
Board present. 
Pending final appointn1ent, the Board ap-
points E. Allen Bateman as State S·uperintendent 
of Public Instruction and as Executive Officer of 
the Board at the present salary ($6,000 per year.) 
Such appointment is to be effective as of August 
16, 1951, and Superintendent E~ Allen Bateman is 
authorized to sign all documents and carry out all 
business of the Board according to Board policy. 
On October 5, 1951, the State Board of Education 
appointed E. Allen Bateman State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction and fixed his salary at $10,000 per 
year. Exhibit "A" attached to Complaint. On October 
9, 1951, the Board of Examiners, by a vote of two to 
one, approved the request of the State Board of Educa-
tion to pay the Superintendent a salary of $10,000 per 
year. Exhibit "B," attache.d to Complaint. 
Section 5, Chapter 123, Laws of Utah 1951, provides 
that "Salaries of all state officers and employees shall 
be paid semi-monthly." Salary claims were. submitted 
for and on behalf of the Superintendent of Public In.:. 
struction f-or the payroll p·eriods October 1 to 15, 1951, 
and October 16 to 31, 1951, and said salary claims, each 
in the amount of $416.66, were app·roved by the Board 
of Examiners, by a vote of 2 to 1. Exhibits "C", "D", 
"E" and "F", attached to Complaint. Defendants, how-
ever, refused, and despite the demand of Plaintiffs, still 
refuse, to prepare and issue warrants to Superintendent 
Bateman in payment of said salary claims. No salary 
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has been paid to Superintendent Bateman since his ap-
pointment by the Board of Education on October 5, 1951. 
Chapter 14, Laws of Utah 1943, (Section 87-5-3.10) pro-
vides that warrants shall be prepared, issued and drawn 
by the Commission of Finance. 
Except for the allegations in the Answer filed here-
in, defe~dants have not advised plaintiffs of the reason 
or reasons why they have. refused, and still continue to 
refuse, to prepare, draw and issue warrants for salary 
claims of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION WAS AUTHOR-
IZED TO APPOINT AND FIX THE SALARY OF THE SU-
PERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION. 
Effect of 1950 constitutional amendments. 
That part of the amendment to Section 8, Article X 
providing for the election of members of the State Board 
of Education was not self-executing. 
Ef!ect of the implementing legislation. 
Superintendent Bateman's term was shortened, but 
t~e office was not abolished and no vacancy was created. 
The offices of members of the Board were not abol-
ished and no vacancies were created. 
_ Under the amendments and statutes the Board of 
Edu_cation ~as authorized to appoint and fix the salary 
of the Supenntendent. · 
10 
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POINT II. 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
TO FIX THE SUPERINTENDENT'S SALARY WAS SUB-
JECT ONLY TO APPROVAL BY THE BOARD OF EXAMI-
NERS, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS. 
Salary of Superintendent no longer had to be "fixed 
by la,v." 
Not being a salary fixed by law, approval by the 
Board of Exruniners was necessary. 
The salary claims having be.en approved by the 
Board of Examiners the Commission of Finance could 
not refuse to issue warrants if funds weTe available. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION WAS AUTHOR-
IZED TO APPOINT AND FIX THE SALARY OF THE SU-
PERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION. 
Effect of 1950 constitutional amendments. 
Prior to its amendment in 1950 Article X, Section 
8 of the Utah Constitution provided that the State Board 
of Education consisted of the "Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and such other persons as the. Legislature 
may provide." By Section 75-7-1, UCA 1943, the Legis-
lature had provided that the Board "shall consist of the 
state superintendent of public instruction and nine· other 
persons, appointed by seven regional school board con-
ventions." 
The 1950 amendment changed Article X, Section 8 
to read: 
11 
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d rvision of the The general control an supe . 
public school system shall be vested ln. a State 
Board of Education the members of which shall 
be ele~cted as provided by law. 
The Board shall appoint the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction who shall be the ex-
ecutive officer of the Board. 
By Chapter 16, ·Laws of Utah 1951, First Special Session, 
the Legislature established the machinery for the elec-
tion of members of the Board, continued the terms of 
present members of the Board until elections are held in 
1952, 1954 and 1956 and their successors are elected and 
qualified, and also provided that the Board "shall fix 
the salary of the state superintendent of public instruc-
tion, who shall be the executive officer of the board." 
Article VII, Sections 1, 10 and 20, prior to their 
amendment in 1950, provided: 
The Executive Department shall consist of 
Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, 
State Treasurer, Attorney Gene·ral, and Super-
intendent of Public Instruction, each of who~ 
shall hold his office for four years, beginning on 
the first Monday of January next after his ~lec­
tion. * * • (Sec. 1) 
* * * If the office of secretary of the state, 
state. auditor, state treasurer, attorney gene·ral, 
or superintendent of public instruction be vacated 
by death, resignation or otherwise, it shall be the 
duty of the. governor to fill the same by appoint-
ment, and the appointee shall hold his office until 
his successor shall be elected and qualified as may 
be b~ law provided. (Sec. 10) ' 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The GoYernor, Serretary of State,, Auditor, 
Treasurer, _1-\.ttorney GeneTal, Superintendent of 
Public Instruction and surh other State- and dis-
triet officers as 1nay be provided fo~ by law, shall 
receive for their services monthly, a compensation 
as fixed by la,Y. * * * (See. 20) 
The 1950 a1nendments deleted the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction from each of the three Sections of 
Article \"'"II. 
The 1950 runendments did not change Section 19 of 
Article \"'II which provides : 
The Superintendent of Public Instruction 
shall perform such duties as may be pro;vided by 
law. 
Neither did the 1950 amendments delete the reference to 
the office of Superintendent of Public Instruction in Sec-
tion 15 of the same Article, which deals with the Board 
of Reform School Commissioners. 
The effect of the amendment to Article X, Section 
8 of the Constitution was to: 
1. Provide that the State Board of Educa-
tion shall be "elected as provided by law," whe,re-
as in the past the members have been appointed 
by regional school board conventions. 
2. Eliminate the Superintendent from mem-
bership on the Board. 
3. Authorize the Board to appoint the Su-
perintendent, "who shall be the executive officer 
of the Board." 
The effect of the an1endment to Article VII, Sections 
1, 10 and 20 was to : 
13 
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1. Eliminate the Superinte·ndent from ~he 
. . t"t t• g the Executive list of elected officers cons 1 u In . 
Department. That Department now consist~ of 
the Governor Secretary of State, State Auditor, 
State Treasu;er and Attorney General. 
2. Take the Superintendent out fr_om the 
provisions of Section 2 of Article VII, which pro-
vide·s that the officers named in Section 1 shall 
be elected, etc. 
3. Take the Superintendent out from the 
provisions of Section 3 of Article VII, which, 
among other things, provides that no person shall 
be eligible to any office listed in Section 1 unless 
he (a) is a qualified elector, and (b) shall have 
been a resident citizen of the. State for five years 
next preceding his election. 
4. Take the office of Superintendent out of 
the list of offices set out in Section 10 to which, in 
the event of vacancies, the Governor may make 
appointments. 
5. Take the Superintendent out of the. list of 
Executive Department office-rs and other state 
and district officers who, by virtue of Section 
20, "shall receive for their service:S monthly, a 
comp_ensation as fixed by law," etc. 
That part of the amendment to Section 8, Article X, 
providing for the election of members of the State Board 
of Education was not· self-executing. 
In determining whether a constitutional amendment 
is self-executing. the question is whether the "consti-
tutional provision is addressed to the courts or to the 
legislature.'' Wbe·re, as in the case before the Court, 
the le-gislature is directed to make suitable provisions 
14 
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for carrying the runendment into effect that amend-
Inent is Hobviously addressed to the legislature and is 
indicative of the intention that such amendment should 
not become effective until made so by an act of the lHgis-
lature." 11. ~-lm. Jur. p. 690, Sec. 73. A constitutional 
provision is self-executing only if there is nothing to be 
done by the legislature to put it into operation, if the 
rights conferred and liabilities imposed are fixed by 
the Constitution itself, "and there is no language· indi-
cating that the subject is referred to the legislature for 
action. 11 Am. Jur. p. 692. Provisions relating to elec-
tions are not self-executing which "by express terms or 
by implication show the necessity for action by the legis-
lature in order that they may become effective." 16 C.J.S. 
p. 109 Sec. 53. See In Re Montello Salt Co., 88 U. 283, 
53 P. 2d 727, 729, and Anderson v. Cook, 102 P. 265, 130 
P. 2d 278 ; State ex rei Richardson v. Ewing, 17 Mo. 515 ; 
State ex rel Hudd v. Timme Secretary of State (Wis., 
1882) 11 N.W. 785; Opinion of Justices 3 Gray (Mass.) 
601; State v. Scott, 9 Ark. 270. 
We think there can be no doubt that the provision 
in qn~stion was not self-executing. It specifically states 
that the mHmbers of the Board of Education shall be 
elected "as provided by law." Clearly this provision was 
directed to the LHgislature, and implementing legislation 
was necessary to carry it out. 
Effect of the implementing legislation. 
As previously noted, several bills were introduced 
in the Regular Session of the 1951 Legislature to imple-
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ment the constitutional amendme·nts adopted in 1950. 
These bills failed of passage, howeve~r, and the subject 
was added to the agenda of the Special Se,ssion which 
convened in June 1951. See letter of the Gove~rnor to 
the House dated June 6, 1951, .House Journal, 29th Legis-
lature, First Special Ses.sion, p. 24, and Senate Journal, 
p. 32. Two statutes which were enacted at that Special 
Session are now designated Chapters 16 and 17, Laws of 
Utah 1951, First Special Session. 
Chapter 16 amended Section 75-7-1, UCA 1943, to 
provide that the "state board of education shall consist 
of nine pe.rsons elected by qualified registe·red electors 
according to election districts, as hereinafter provided." 
It set up election districts on the same geographical 
basis as judicial districts, established a nominating pro-
cedure and then provided that the "elections shall be 
conducted as a part of the general election with the same 
judges of election, the same constables, and the same poll-
ing places, bu~ with separate ballots." After stipulating 
that the returns shall be canvassed by district boards of 
education and the State Board of Education, Chapter 
16 (in Sec. 75-7-1.50) p·rovided (1) that in the November, 
1952 general election, and e:very six years thereafter, 
three members shall be elected from Regional District 
No. 3, (2) that in the November, 1954 gene~ral election, 
and every six . years thereafter, one member shall be 
elected in each of Regional Districts Nos. 4, 6 and 1, and 
( 3) that in the N ovembe~r, 1956 gene:ral election, and 
every six years thereafteT, one member shall be elected 
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in each of Regional Districts Nos. 5, 2 and 7. This. ne:w 
section then provided: 
Each member of the state board. of education 
shall be elected for a ter1n of six years and until 
his successor is elected and qualified. · 
The terms of office of the present members 
of the state board of education are continued un-
til their successors are elected and qualify. 
Chapter 16 also runended Section 75-7-2 to in p·art 
provide: 
The state board of education shall elect from 
its members a chairman and vice-chairman. Such 
officers shall be elected or appointed at the first 
meeting of the board in F·ebruary, 1952, and each 
year thereafter. The duties of these officers shall 
be determined by the board. The, board shall also 
appoint a secretary of the board who shall se~rve 
at the pleasure of the board. 
The state board of education shall appoint 
and shall fix the salary of the state superi:~lten­
dent of"public instruction, who shall be· the execu-
tive officer of the board. 
After making provision for the appointment of 
assistant superintendents, directors, supervisors, as-
sistants, clerical workers and other employees., and f~:r 
the fixing of their salaries by the Board, the statute 
also provides for an allowance of $300.00 per year for 
members of the Board and for the payment of traveling 
expenses. It concludes with this provision: 
All existing statutes of the state of Utah which 
are inconsistent or in conflict with this act, are to 
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the extent of such inconsistency or conflict, de-
clared null and void insofar as they relate to the 
provisions of this act. 
The provisions of Chapter 16 are consistent with 
the amendments adopted by the people in 1950, and with 
other pro:visions: of , the Constitution of this State. By 
enacting what is now Chapter 17, Laws of Utah 1951, 
First Special Session, the legislature specified what 
qualifications the Superintendent of Public Instruction 
must have and made it clear that he should "se!rve at the 
pleasure of the Board." The two statutes appropriately 
implemented the constitutional amendments and com-
pleted the· changes in the State Board of Education and 
in the· office of Superintendent of Public Instruction en-
dorsed by the people of this state when they adopted 
the amendments in 1950. 
It will be noted that the first sentence· of Section 
75-7-1.50 reads as foJlows: 
There shall be elected on the first Tuesday 
after the first Monday of November in 1951, one 
me·mber of the state board of education from 
Regional District No. 7. 
We submit that it was a case· of pure· inadvertence to 
leave this sente;nce· in the Section, and that the wording 
of the sentence is so meaningless and so inconsistent 
with the obvious intention of the Le·gislature that it 
should be rejected as surplusage and omitted, eliminated 
and disregarded. 
Chapter 16 was H.B. No. 9 in the Special Session. 
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As introduced H.B. No.9 provided that on the first Wed-
nesday in Dece1nber, 1951, one 1nen1ber of the state board 
of education should be elected fro1n each of Regional 
Districts Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and that in 1952 three 
members should be elected from Regional District No. 
3. The Journal of the proceedings in the. House1 shOiws 
that the House runended this section to provide for the 
election of one member from Regional District No. 7 in 
November, 1951, the election of three members from Dis--· 
trict No. 3 in D·ecen1ber, 1952·, and for the election of the. 
other five members, one each year, in the following 
order : Region No. 4 in 1953, Region No. 6 in 1954, Re~­
gion No. 1 in 1955, Region No. 5 in 1956, and Region No~. 
2 in 1957. (House Journal 29th Legislature, First Sp·ecial 
Session, pp. 103-104) 
When H.B. No. 9 was before the S·enate it was 
amended so that Section 75-7-1.50 provided for the elec-
tion of three members from· District No. 3 in November 
1952, one member from each of Districts Nos. 4, 6 and 
1 in 1954, and one member from each of Districts Nos. 
5, 2 and .7 in 1956. The Senate also amended the bill 
to provide that the elections should be conducted as part 
of the general elections, with the same .judges, constables, 
and _polling places, but with separate ballots. (Senate 
Journal 29th Legislature, First S.pecial Session, pp. 126-
127) It was purely an oversight not to strike out the first 
sentence of the Section, quoted above .. That sentence is 
wholly inconsistent with the provision that elections of 
members of the State Board of Education should be con-
ducted as part of the general elections. Not only was 
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there no general election in 1951, but no machinery what-
soever was set up to conduct any district-wide election 
in District No. 7; or any other district in the state in that· 
year. Furthe1rmore, the bill as passed prOivided (in Sec. 
75-7-1.20) for nominations to be made by district con-
ventions in the month ·of March in 1952, 1954 and 1956, 
and each six years thereafter. No provision was made 
for any nominating convention in 1951-in fact Chapter 
i6, which was passed on June 16, 1951, did not become 
effective until August 15, 1951. While the. alternate 
me;thod of bein~ nominated- by filing a petition with 
the Secretary of State on or before the last Wednesday 
of September - was still open, the conclusion is in-
escapable that the Legislature did not intend that an elec-
tion should be held in 1951. If it had so intended it would 
have provided the necessary machinery for holding a dis-
trict-wide election and most likely would have provided 
a special nominating procedure. 
The election of one member in 1951 is inconsistent 
with -the provisions in Sectioo 75-7-1 as amended by 
Chapter 16, and in Section 75-7-1.50 that each member 
should be elected for a tenn of six years. It will be re-
membered that Section 75-7-1.50 provided that in 1956 
-which would be only five years after 1951-one mem-
ber should be e~lected from Regional District No. 7. We 
submit that the sentence in question comes within the 
rule that where "words of a statute are so meaningless 
or inconsistent with the intention of the legislature other-
wise plainly expressed in the statute, * * * they may be 
rejected as surplusage, and omitted, eliminated, or dis-
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regarded." 50 An1. J ur., Statutes, Sec. 231, p. 219. See 
Leibson v. Henry, 356 nlo. ~)53, :204 S.W. 2d 310; State v. 
Bates, 961\Iinn. 110, 104 N.,:v. 709. 
Superintendent Bateman's term was shortened, but the 
office was not abolished and no vacancy was created. 
The proposal to amend Sections 1, 10 and 20 of 
Article ' 7II concluded \vith this language: 
If adopted by the electors of the~ State, this 
amendment shall take effect the first day of J anu-
ary, 1951. 
The amendments to Sections 1, 10 and 20, clearly weTe 
self-executing. There was nothing in them that was di-
rected to the Legislature. Likewise, that part of the 
amendment to Section 8 of Article X which provided that 
the Superintendent should be appointed by the State 
Board of Education was self-executing and needed no 
legislation to be carried into effect. Together, these 
amendatory provisions changed the constitutional office 
of Superintendent of Public Instruction from one elected 
by the people, to one which thereafter should be filled hy 
appointment by the State Board of Education. They also 
removed the Superintendent from the list of officers 
whose compensation must be "fixed by law," and re-
mov~ the office fro~ th~ list of those which, in the e;v:ent 
of vacancies, can he filled by gubernatorial ap.pointment. 
This Court in the case of Snow v. Keddington, 11.3 
U. 325, 195 P. 2d 234, held that while the. general rule 
is that "a constitutional amendment becomes effective 
on the date it is passed by a majority vote of the people" 
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this rule is "not applicable- if the amendme-nt that is sub-
mitted to the voters include:S a pro¥ision that the same 
shall take effe.ct on a later designated date." Under the 
authority of that case it would appear that the effective 
date of the amendments to Sections 1, 10 and 20 of Arti-
cle. VII was January 1, 1951, and that that part of the 
amendment to Section 8 of Article X which pro:vides 
that the State Board of Education shall appoint the Su-
perintendent of Public Instruction became effective when 
appro~ed by the voters. 
In the Snow case this Court also recognized the prin-
ciple that puplic offices may be ''created, abolished, or 
the time shortened or lengthened by constitutional 
I 
amendment.'' 
In the leading case of Luckett v. Madison County, 
137 Miss. 1, 101 So. 851, 37 ALR 814, the Court said: 
Certainly the people of the state by constitu-
tional provision may abolish any office at any 
time. The Constitution is supreme, and voices the 
command of the sovereign people. The office 
holder has no vested right therein, nor does he 
hold the office· by contract. 
S.ee also Martello v. ~uperior Court, etc. 202 Cal. 400, 
261 P. 476; Deupree v. Payne, 197 Cal. 529, 241 P. 669; 
State v. Duncan, 108 Mont. 141, 88 P. 2d 73; State v. 
Cooney, 70 Mont. 355, 22·5 P. 1007; 42 Am. Jur. pp. 904-
906; 4 ALR 210, and 172 ALR 1375. 
The effect of the amendments to Se·ction 8 of Article 
X and Sections 1, 10 and 20 of Article VII was to shorten 
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Dr. Baten1an's ter1n, to 'vhich he was electe~d in 1948, to 
January 1, 1951, or earlier. It 1nay be concluded that 
that part of the nn1endn1ent of Section 8 of Article X, 
providing that the Superintendent should be appointed 
by the Board, alone shortened the term to which Dr. 
Bateman '""as elected. ('iertainly, that amendatory provi-
sion plus the amendn1ents to Sections 1, 10 and ·20 of 
Article, '~II acco1nplished a shortening of the term. The 
Board of Education could have made an effective ap-
pointment on whatever date the term was shortened. · 
When the amendments are considered in the light 
of the circumstances under which they we,re proposed 
and adopted, the intent of the legislature and of the 
people in approving them, it is clear that they did not 
abolish the office of Superintendent, nor _did th_ey create 
any vac~cy in that office. The purpose of the two a-
mendments adopted in 1950 was to take the S-upe:rinten-
dent _"out of politics" by changing the office from one that 
was elective to one that was appoin-tive, and to give the 
power of appointment to the Board of Education. Neither 
by specific provision, nor by implication, do the am~nd­
ments indicate any intention to abolish the constitutional 
office of Superintendent. While the. Superintende·nt is 
no longer one of the elective officers making up the Ex-
ecutive Department, as defined in Seetion 1 of Article 
VII, and the duties of the office are some~what changed, 
nevertheless the status and duties of the Superintendent 
are still defined g~nerally by constitutional provisions. 
Section 8 of Article X, as amended, prOivides that the 
Superintendent shall be appointed by the Board, and 
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that he shall be the executive officer of the. Board, and 
Section 19 of Articie VII still provides that the Superin-
tendent "shall p·erform such duties as may be pro;vi.ded 
by law." 
Clearly, the Superintendent is still a constitutional 
officer. The constitutional status, functions and duties 
of the office are not subject to change or termination 
by the Legislature.. ~hat body may not deprive the 
Superintendent of his status as the e;xecutive office-r of 
the Board, nor take from him the powers and duties 
which the people conferred upon him when they made 
him the executive officer of the Board. Likewise, the 
Legislature may not provide for a different method or 
procedure for selecting the Superintendent than that set 
out in the constitutional amendment. Under Section 19 
of Article VII the Legislature may provide additional 
duties to be performed by the Superintendent consistent 
with his status as an appointee and executive officer of 
the Board and consistent with his constitutional duties 
as such, but the people alone have the power to alte:r or 
take away his constitutional status, powers and duties. 
At the time Dr. Bateman was elected to the office 
of Superintendent in 1948 both the Constitution and Sec~ 
tion 75-8-1, UCA 1943, provided that his term should be 
for four years. Section 75-8-1 added the words "and un-
til his successor is _'elected and qualified." If the consti-
tutional amendments which shortened his term also by 
implication repealed the provisions of Section 75-8-1, then 
at least on ,January 1, 1951, there was no sp.eci:fic statu-
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tory or constitutional proYision authorizing the Superin-
tendent to hold o:ver until his successor was either elected 
or appointed and qualified. ''T e think it is clear, under 
the authority of the holding of this Court in Pete,rson 
v. Benson~ 38 U. 286, 112 P. 801, that Dr. Bateman was 
at least a de facto officer until the time of his appoint-
Inent by the Board, at 'vhich time he became a de jure 
officer. 
The fact situation before the Court in the Pete·rson 
case briefly was as follows: the town marshal in Logan 
was elected for a two year term at the election in Novem-
ber 1907; in 1909 the Legislature amended the law. to 
provide that the marshal should be appointed by the 
mayor; this amended law was in effect when the mar-
shal's two year term expired on January 3, 1910, but no 
appointment was made, and the action was brought to 
recover his salary for the month of February, 1910; 
while the law under which the marshal was elected p·ro-
vided that his term was for two years and until his suc-
cessor was elected and qualified, there was, of coursH, no 
such provision in the new law which authorized the ap·-
pointment of the marshal. The Court held that the mar-
shal was not holding over, but was a de facto officer and 
was entitled to the compensation of the office. - In so 
ruling the court said : 
As appellant was not appointed to the office 
after his term expired, and the law under which he 
had been elected having been, in effect, repealed, 
it follows that during the month. of February, 
1910, he was not a de jure officer, and was in no 
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sense a holdover as the term 'holdover' is under-
stood when appiied to a person holding a public 
office. State v. Simon, 20 Or. 365, 26 Pac. 170. 
It does appear, however, that he was a de facto 
officer and as such discharged all the: duties 
' . 
of the office during the month of February, 
1910. The important question therefore is, 
can an actual incumbent of a public office, 
who is only an officer de facto and in no sense a 
de jure officer, maintain an action for the salary, 
fees, or other compensation attached to the office, 
there being no adverse claimant, or de jure of-
ficer' * * • In cases, however, where there is no 
de jure officer, the line of-decisions last mentioned 
hold that a de facto officer who, in good faith, 
has had possession of the office and has dis-
charged the duties pertaining the,reto, is legally 
entitled to the emoluments of the office and may, 
in an appropriate action, recover the salary, fees, 
and other compensation attached to the office. 
See also Fowler et al. v. Gillman, et al., 76 U. 414, 
290 P. 358. 
In Section 141 of 67 C.J.S. Officers, page 444, ap-
pears the following statement. 
One who holds over after the expiration of his 
legal term,· where no provision is made by law for 
his holding over, is gener~lly regarded as a de 
facto officer, but on the office being filled either 
by appointment or election, as may be provided by 
statute for the filling of the office, and the quali-
fication of the appointee or electee, the de facto 
status terminates. 
In Section 135 of the same volume, at page 440, is the 
following: 
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-.A~ 
,. 
Office holding de facto is a fiction of law 
designed to serve a useful purpose, but t:P,e. fiction 
does not abolish the la.,v. While a de facto officer 
has been held not to be an· officer, although his 
acts may have legal effect, he has also been held 
to be a legal officer until ousted, and to be sub-
mitted to as such until displaced by a regular 
direct proceeding for that purpose. 
From the time his elective term was shortened by 
adoption of the 1950 amendments until he was appointed 
Superintendent by the Board of Education, Dr. Bateman 
was at least the de facto Superintendent of Public In-
struction. His acts were legal and he was entitled to the 
emoluments of the office. The office had not been abol-
ished and there was no vacancy which could be filled by 
the Governor under Section 9 of Article VII of the Utah 
Constitution. Dr. Bateman was eligible for appointment 
to the office by the Board, and he was properly appoint-
ed. 
The offices of members of tb,e Board were not abolished 
and no vacancies were created. 
The amendment to Section 8 of Article X did not 
abolish the State Board of Education. It changed the 
membership of the Board by taking the Superintendent 
()ff, changed the method of sel~ting membe·rs of the 
Board by providing that they "shall be elected as pro-
vided by law,"' and gave the Board the additional consti-
tutional power to appoint the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction. No change was made in its fundamental 
constitutional . powers and duties to exe:rcise "general 
control and supervision of the public school system." 
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Just as in the case of the Superintendent,. there is 
nothing in this amendment which either specifically, or 
by implication, indicates any intention to abolish the 
offices or to affect their status as constitutional offices. 
The ve·ry fact that the Legislature in Sec. 75-7-1.50 pro-
vided that the "terms of office of the present members 
of the state board of education are continued until their 
successors are elected and qualify" shows that that body 
did not consider the offices aboJished. That part of the 
amendment to Sec. 8 of Article X which changed the 
met~od of selecting members of the Board was not self-
executing and was directed to the Legislature for action. 
'rhe Legislature in carrying out the constitutional man-
date properly acted to continue· the terms of the incum-
bents so as to prevent any hiatus or interruption in the 
administration of the educational system of the State. 
In carrying into effect the non-self-executing consti-
tutional provision the Legislature legally could have 
shortened the terms of all members of the Board and 
provided for immediate elections. The Legislature, how-
ever, decided that the entire membership of the Board 
should not be elected in the same election. Consquently, 
the election machinery approved provides for the elec-
tion of three members in 1952, three in 1954 and three 
in 1956. Actually, the provision in the statute continu-
ing the terms until their successors are elected and quali-
fied lengthens the terms of some membe:rs and shortens 
the terms of others. 
In Snow v. Keddington, supra, this Court recognized 
the powe-r of the Legislature to harmonize and produce 
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unifonnity in terms of office. The principle was stated 
in this language : 
The legislature has the power to secure uni-
formity in official terms and to harmonize the 
terms of office of county officers. The fact that 
by changing the co1nmencement date of a term, 
one officer obtains an additional period in which 
to serve does not render the plan illegal. If the act 
is fairly intended to co~ordinate and unify the 
various county offices into an operating political 
body with continuity, and is not intended solely 
to grant incumbent officers an extra term, then it 
cannot be rejected because it may extend a term 
of one office. 
See also State ex rel Jordan v. Bailey (Minn. 1887) 
33 N.W. 778. The Legislature was well within its power 
when it directed that three members of the Board be 
elected in 1952, three in 1954 and three in 1956, and that 
the terms of the incumbent members of the Board should 
be continued until their successors were elected and 
qualified. This action conformed to the mandate of the 
people as set out in the amendment calling upon the legis--
lature to provide when and in what manner members 
of the_ Board should be elected and how many members 
should constitute the Board. 
An interesting case involving a somewhat similar 
situation is State ex rei Richardson v. Ewing, 17 Mo. 515 
(1853). There the constitutional amendment abolished 
the section of the constitution providing for the appoin.t-
Inent of the Secretary of State and then pro¥ide·d that 
that officer "shall be elected by the qualified voters of 
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this state at such time and in such manner as shall be 
' provided by law." Ewing had been appointed to the office 
for a four year term in 1849. The amendment was 
adopted in 1851 and Richardson was elected to the office 
in 1852. In holding that the amendment did not abolish 
the office and did not create any vacancy the court said: 
The first impression made by reading this 
amendment is, that the office created by the ori-
ginal constitution is abolished by abolishing the 
clause under which it existed; but an attentive 
examination of the whole amendment will satisfy 
the mind, that such is not its effect. * * * The 
whole amendment being ratified, the two clauses 
went into force together, and the second clause 
took its place in the constitution as the provision 
under which the office of secretary of state was to 
continue. Under it, the duty was imposed upon 
the general assembly to provide for the election 
of a secretary by the voters of the state ; and when 
such provision was made and a person was duly 
elected to the office, then there would be a secre-
tary of state elected, as the constitution required. 
In the mean time, before such election, the office 
existed, and the present incumbent was not dis-
turbed in his right to it by the terms of the amend-
ment. The office under the amendment, is the 
same office that existed before. As the. amend-
ment contemplated legislation for the purpose. of 
electing a person to hold the office, and as the 
time at which such election should be held was 
left entirely to the discretion of the legislature, 
it would be a forced construction of the amend-
ment to make it continue the office in being, and 
still render it vacant. It may be· admitted that, 
after the amendment was adopted the clause in 
the original constitution ceased to h~ve any opera-
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tion, and had no effect either upon the office. or 
the rights of the officer. Still the amendment is 
to be regarded as having been adopted with refe-r-
ence to the actual condition of things existing at 
its adoption. The office. then existed, and it was 
enjoyed by an officer regularly appointed. The 
amendment continued the ex~stence of the office, 
and proposed that, at a future time, it should be 
filled by the election of an officer. It is but a 
reasonable interpretation of the amendment to 
say that, by implication fro1n its own terms, it 
continued the incumbent in office. until a secretary 
should be elected under the amendment. It speaks 
in the future; 'there shall be a secretary of state, 
who shall be elected.' Until such secretary fs 
elected, it is implied that the officer in p-ossession 
of the office shall continue to possess it. * * * 
In that case the Missouri legislature by an act passed 
in 1851 had provided that "the incumbents of any of the 
offices aforesaid shall hold their office until their suc-
cessors shall be elected and qualified." That language 
is similar to the provision in the statute passed by the 
Special Session that the "terms of office of the present 
members of the state board of education are continued 
until their successors are elected and qualify." The Mis-
souri court held that even if the constitutional amend-
ment were construed as leaving the pe.rson then in the 
office "without any right to it, under the· constitution, it 
is clear that no provision was made for any other p.erson 
to hold it, until a per~on should be elected under a law 
to be enacted by the general assembly." Under the cir-
cumstances, the court said, the incumbent was entitled 
to hold over under the statutory pro:vision. 
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The court held that when an election was held under 
the impleme!nting statute such elected official was en-
titled to the office-, and concluded with this language·: 
This construction gives to Mr. Richardson the 
right to the office from tl).e time of his election, 
prevents any interregnum, preserves the govern-
ment from confusion that would otherwise be in-
troduced into its affairs, and gives effect to the 
intention of the people and the general assembly. 
In the Ewing case the argument that the consti-
tutional amendment abolished the appointive office was 
materially strengthened by the provision which specifi-
cally abolished the section of the constitution which au-
thorized such appointment. In the case before this court 
the amendment to Section 8 of Article X simply changed 
the members of the board from appointive to elective 
officers. It would be a forced interpretation of the· amend-
ment, and certainly would be contrary to the intent of the 
people, to conclude that the offices of members on the 
Board were abolished or that vacancies were created 
in such offices. 
In the case of State ex rei Hudd v. Timme, Secretary 
of State, (Wis. 1882), 11 N.W. 785 the Court had before 
it a constitutional amendment providing that the legis-
lature should meet biennially instead of annually, and 
increasing le.gislators' salaries. The Court held that 
the amendment did not go in effect immediately so as 
to be applicable- to members of the legislature elected 
in the same election at which the amendment was ap-
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proved, and that it could not go into effect until the legis-
lature had fixed the tiine for sessions of the biennial 
legislature and an election had been held. In so ruling 
the court said: 
It is our duty to examine and construe the 
amendment as it has been adopted by the legis-
lature and the people, and give it effect if we can, 
without interrupting the harmonious action of the 
government, until such time as its pro:visions can 
be carried into effect by proper action unde~r it. 
In giving construction to these provisions we 
must look at the existing state of things at the 
time of their adoption, and they must be conside~r­
ed in connection with the proposed change;. * * * 
It would be absurd to hold that there was any 
intention, either on the part of the legislature or 
the people, to interrupt the regular course of 
government of the state· by the adoption of these 
amendments.*** 
These pro:visions contemplate. that there 
would be a constitutional law-making body in the 
state after the adoption of the amendment and 
before any legislature could be elected or convene 
under it. There can be, we think, no doubt. but 
that the legislature in passing it, and the p·eople 
in ratifying, the amendment conte-mplated and in-
tended that the old system of things should re-
main in full force until an election could take place 
under the new. Any other construction of the 
amendment would be in plain contradiction of its 
terms, and would render it impossible to p·ut its 
provisions into practical effect. To hold that these 
amendments took effect immediately on their adop·-
tion, so as to absoJutely aboJish the present p·ro-
visions of the constitution for all purposes, would 
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compel us to hold that the present le-gislature was 
not a constitutional body, and that all its proceed-
ings we·re absolutely void. We think no such con-
struction is required from the language used in 
the amendment; and it is very clear that such was 
not the intention either of the legislature or the 
people-. 
The- Wisconsin court relied upon Opinion of Justices, 
3 Gray (Mass.) 601 and State v. Sc~·tt, 9 Ark. ?70. In 
the Massachusetts opinion the Justices of the Supreme 
Court of that State answered questions propounded by 
the Governor of that state as to the effect of a consti-
tutional amendment p·roviding for the election of mem-
bers of the executive council. Prior to the amendment 
members of. the council were appointed by the Legisla-
ture. The Justices he-ld that the amendment could not 
be "practicaliy carried into effect, and there can be no 
election of councillors by the people,_ until the legislature 
shall have divided the Commonwealth into eight dis-
tricts," as required by'the amendment. 
The constitutional amendment involved in the case 
of State· v. Sc:ott, supra, related to the method of selecting 
circuit judges. Prior to the amendment they were ap-
pointed, but the amendment provided: "The qualified 
v9ters of each judicial circuit in this state shall elect 
their circuit judge." As to the effect of this amendment 
the court said : 
If the oamendment so operated as to occasion 
a vacancy immediately upon its adoption, there 
being no express declaration to that effect, it can 
result alone from the fact that, in the transfer 
of the power of filling the office to the people 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the several circuits, the entire foundation upon 
which the inrtunbent stood was overturned and 
utterly destroyed. Ho'v 'vould such a construction 
comport with the obvious sense of the. terms use.d 
and the manifest intention of the fran1ers of the 
instrun1ent; or, in other words, would it be a fair 
and liberal interpretation and such an one as 
would be calculated to promote the true objects 
of the grant~ If the amendment will bear such a 
construction as to allow other provisions of the 
constitution to stand without doing violence to 
any, it is then clearly permissible to put such a 
construction upon it. If the intention -was to cre·-
ate vacancies, is it not fair and re·asonable. to s-up-
pose that words would have been employed direct-
ly and emphatically declarative of that purpose, 
and that no room would have been left for doubt 
or construction~ I apprehend that such would 
have been the case. * * * -The mere amendment 
itself cannot be said, in any possible view of the 
case, to produce a vecancy in the office; for all 
that could be claimed under it would be. a mere 
naked power to be called into life and ·action when 
it should please- the legislature· to pass a law fix-
ing the time and prescribing the manner of p·ut-
ting it into operation. This is the strongest view 
that could be taken against the defendant, and 
this most clearly shows that it could not go into 
immediate operation. The distinction then that 
lies at the bottom of the whole matter is, that the 
amendment was not designed to act either upon 
the office or the incumbent during his constitu-
tional term, but that the only end and object of 
it was to change the mode of exe~rcising the power 
of filling the offices. It is argued that, inasmuch 
as the _power to elect the circuit judges has been 
taken away from the Legislature, and transfe~rred 
to the qualified voters of the several circuits, 
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there.fore the people have resumed one. of the sov-
ereign powers of the government, and that by the 
. mere act of resumption, or withdrawal, of the 
power,· the office that had p-reviously been filled 
by its exercise, was immediately vacated. To the 
correctness of this proposition, I cannot yield by 
assent. The power to fill the office· of circuit 
judge is equally sovereign whether exercised by 
the people's representatives, or by the. people 
themselves, and as a matter of course, the rights 
that attach themselves to the officer upon the elec-
tion, in either mode, must be ide·ntically the same. 
Under the amendments and statutes the Board of Educa-
tion was authorized to appoint and fix the salary of the 
Superintendent. 
Those parts of the constitutional amendments which 
deleted the office of S.uperintendent of Public Instruction 
from Se:ctions 1, 10 and 20 of Article VII, and which 
authorized the Board of Education to appoint the Super-
intendent, were self-executing. They had the effect of 
shortening the tenn to which Dr. Bateman was elected 
in 1948,. and authorized the State Board of Education 
to appoint the Superintendent. The amendments neither 
abolished the office of Superintendent, nor did they cre-
ate any vacancy in the· office. 
As we view the matter, the amendment to Section 
8 of Article X authorizing the Board of Education to 
make an ap·pointment to the office of Superintendent 
became e.ffective upon adoption by the people, and the 
amendment of Sections 1, 10 and 20 of Article VII took 
effect on January 1, 1951. The amendment of Sections 
1,. 10 and 20 and Section _8 of Article X shortened the 
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term to "rhich the Superintendent was elected in 1948 
to January 1, 1951, after which date Dr. Bateman held 
the office at least as a de facto officer until the time: of 
his appointment by the Board of Education. 
The statute passed by the Special Session not only 
specifically authorized the Board of Education to appoint 
the Superintendent of Public Instruction but also em-
powered that Board t9 fix his salary. Prope~r action was 
taken by a de jure Board of Education appointing D·r. 
Bateman and fixing his salary. The action setting the 
salary at $10,000 was approved by the· Board of Exa-
miners. Everything that has been done, each step, was 
consistent with both constitutional and statuto~y provi-
. 
s1ons. 
POINT II. 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
TO FIX THE SUPERINTENDENT'S SALARY WAS SUB-
JECT ONLY TO APPROVAL BY THE BOARD OF EXAMI-
NERS, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS. 
~· . 
Salary of Superintendent no longer had to be ufixed by 
law." 
Prior to its amendment in 1950 Section 20 of Article 
VII provided : 
The * * * Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion and such other State and district officers as 
may be provided for by law, shall receive for their 
services monthly, a comp·ensation as fixed by law~ 
The amendment of 1950 deleted th~ Sup·erintendent of 
Public Instruction from that section, thereby eliminat-
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ing the requirement that the compensation of that office 
must be fixed by statute. Consequently it was within 
the· power of the Legislature to provide in Chapter 16, 
Laws of Utah 19~1, First Special Session that the Board 
of· Education "shall fix the salary of the state superin-
tendent of public instruction." 
Not being a salary fixed by law, approval by the Board 
of Examiners was necessary. 
Section 13 of Article VII of the Utah Constitution 
in part provides : 
* * * the Governor, Secretary of State and 
Attorney General * * * shall, also, constitute a 
Board of Examiners, with power to examine all 
claims against the State except salaries or com-
pensation of officers fixed by law, and perform 
such other duties as may be prescribed by law; 
and no claim against the State, except for salaries 
and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall 
be passed upon by the Legislature without having 
been considered and acted upon by the said Board 
of Examiners. (Emphasis added) 
Since the amendment eliminated the requirement 
that the salary of the Superintendent be fixed by law, 
and since the Legislature has specifically provided that 
the salary should be fixed by the Board of Education, 
that compensation no longer comes within the exception 
of Section 13. Consequently, salary claims presented by 
or on behalf of the Superintendent are claims against 
the State which must be examined, considered and acted 
upon by. the Board of Examiners. 
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In discussing the authority of the Board of Examin-
ers as set out in Section 13 this Court in State v. Ed-
wards, 33 U. 243, 93 P. 720, said: 
The powers conferred upon the board of ex-
aminers, with regard to claims against the state, 
by the constitutional provision quoted above, are 
general and sweeping. The power would include 
all claims against the state, were it not for the 
exception which excludes salaries or compensation 
of officers fixed- by law. An exception of this 
character may not be enlarged, or extende:d by im-
plication. An exception which specifies the things 
that are excepted from a general provision 
strengthens the force of the general provisions of 
the law. 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Stat. Const. Sec. 
494. It is an elementary doctrine that, if there 
are any provisions in a statute which in any way 
conflict with a constitutional provision, the Con-
stitution controls. * * * The attempt by the Legis-
lature to -require the Auditor to allow a claim 
which by the Constitution must first be ap·prOived 
by the board of examiners can avail nothing. The 
Auditor is bound by the constitutional provision. 
The Legislature is so bound, and so are we. * * * 
This Court has ruled that claims fo·r bounty for 
killing predatory animals were claims against the state 
requiring approval by the Board of Examiners. Uintah 
State Bank v. Ajax, State Auditor, 77 U. 455, 297 P. 
434. In that case this court said : 
* * * A complete answer to this argument 
is that the Constitution makes no such exception. 
All ·claims are subject to action by the~ board of 
examiners, except only claims for "salaries and 
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compensation of officers fixed by law." The claims 
here are not fixed by law· in the sense that the 
Legislature has made an appropriation of an 
amount certain to a definite named person. * * * 
May the Legislature then, in the face of our con-
stitutional proiVision, pass ove.r the board of ex-
aminers and se~t up some local agency by which 
claims may be fixed and settled without any state 
officer having power to examine and approve or 
disapp.rove, such claim~ 
If we should adopt petitioner's view, it would 
follow that the Legislature might designate any 
officer other than the board of examiners, as au-
thorized in behalf of the state to settle,, fix, or 
liquidate claims and agree upon the amount to be 
paid thereon, and thereby exclude the board of 
examiners from its duty and responsibility with 
respect to claims thus liquidated pursuant to 
legislative_ authority. We cannot agree to any 
such construction of the constitutional language, 
nor may we by construction interpolate the: word 
"unliquidated" into -.the Constitution so that it 
would provide that the board of examine'rs have 
power to "examine all unliquidated claims against 
the state" etc. The Constitution has vested in the 
Board of Examiners the. power to examine and 
pass on all claims except those exempted, and the 
Legislature is without authority to delegate such 
power to any other board or officer. 
Three other states-Nevada, Idaho, and Montana-
have provisions similar to .S-ection 13 creating Boards of 
Examiners with power to examine all claims, with certain 
exceptions, against the States. In State v. Hallock, 20 
Nev. 326, 22 P. 123 the Nevada Supreme Court held that 
an election expense claim certified by a board of county 
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commiSSioners was subject to approval and audit by 
the Board of Examiners. The Court upheld action taken 
by the Board of Examiners adjusting the claim and re-
ducing it from $1,032.15 to $775. The Nevada Court re-
ferred to the "manifest purpose of the constitution to 
protect the treasury by requiring the Board of Exam-
iners to adjust all claims" and added that it was "not 
within the power of the legislature to confer this author-
ity elsewhere." 
The Idaho Supreme Court, .in the case of Supp·iger 
v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P. 2d 362, made the· following 
statement with. reference to the powe:r of the Idaho Board 
of Examiners under a constitutional provision identical 
to the provision in the Utah Constitution: 
The board of examine-rs has sole· discretion-
ary pQ>wer to deeide how and in what m·anner 
it will pass upon and allow or reject claims a-
gainst the state.* * * 
The framers of the Constitution, by express 
direction, placed full and complete power and con-
fidence in the state board of examiners to eocerrcise 
its discretion in the ultimate ap·pro;val or disap-
proval of claims against.the state (State v. Par-
sons, 57 Idaho 775, 69 P. 2d 788) ; * * * 
In the case of s.tate v. Robison, 59 Idaho 485, 83 P. 
2d 983, the Idaho Supreme Court referre~d to the. Board 
of Examiners as the "final arbiters of expenditures." 
Other Utah, Idaho and Montana cases discussing the 
powers of the respective Boards of Examiners are: 
Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm. 95 U. 2'42, 70 P. 
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2d 857; Winte~rs v. ·Ramsey, 4 Idaho 303, 39 P. 193; Ep-
peTson v. How,ell, 28 Idaho 338, 154 P. 621; Kroutinger 
v. Board of Examiners, 8 Idaho 463, 69 P. 279; Pyke v. 
Steuenberg, 5 Idaho 614, 51 P. 614; State v. Parsons, 57 
Idaho 775, 69 P. 2d 788; Bragaw v. Gooding, 14 Idaho 
288, 94 P. 438; Gem Ir~. Dist. v. Gallet, 43 Idaho 519, 
253 P. 128; Curtis v. Moore:, 38 Idaho 193, 221 P. 133; 
and State v. Ericks.en, 75 Mont. 429, 244 P. 287. 
In the 1896 session of the Utah Legislature Section 
13 of Article VII of the Constitution was supplemented 
by statutory provisions dividing claims against the State 
into thre,e cate:gories for examination and consideration 
by the Board of ·Examiners. Chapter XXXV, Laws of 
Utah 1896. Those provisions are now found in Title 26, 
UCA 1943. The three categories into which claims were 
divided are: (1) those for which an appropriation has 
been made; ( 2) those for which (a) no appropriation has 
been made but se~ttlement of the claims has been pro-
vided for _by l~w, or (b) an appropriation has been made 
but has been exhausted; and (3) claims "the settlement of 
which is not otherwise provided for by law." 
· S·al~ry claims by or on behalf of Superintendent 
Bateman cle·arly come within the class for which an ap-
propriation ha~ be-en made. As to such claims Sections 
26-0-7 and 26-0-8 provide : 
Any pe-rsons having a claim against the state 
for which an appropriation has been made may 
present the same to the. board in the form of an 
account or petition, and the secretary of the board 
must date, number and file such claim, and the 
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board must allow or reject the same in the order 
of its presentation. The board may, for cause, 
postpone action upon a claim for not exceeding 
one month. (26-0-7) 
If the board approves such claim, the mem-
bers thereof must indorse thereon, ove.r their 
signatures, 4' approved for the sum of ___________________ _ 
dollars," and transinit the same to the state 
auditor; and the auditor must draw his warrant 
for the ainount so approved in favor of the claim-
ant or his assigns in the order in which the same 
was approved; provided, that where a group· of 
claims is presented from any one department or 
institution and the board approves the same, such 
group of claims may be transmitted to the state 
auditor with one certificate of the board showing 
the claim or cl~s designated by number, the1re-
in approved, the amount for which ap·proved, the 
payee and the appropriation or fund out of which 
payable. Any member voting against the ap-
proval of a claim may specify his objection to its 
allowance in whole or in part by notation on the 
certificate over his signature. ( 26-0-8) 
The exhibits attached to the complaint show that 
the procedure stipulated by the above sections was fol-
lowed, and that a majority of the Board of· Examiners-
approved the salary claims. 
The salary claims having been ap·p·roved by the Bo~ard 
of Examiners the Commission of Finance could not r-e-
fuse to issue warrants if funds were available. 
As previously noted, Plaintiffs have not been ad-
vised as to the grounds or reasons why the Commission 
of Finance refused, and still refuse, to prepare·, draw 
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and issue warrants in payment of the salary of the Su-
perintendent. It appears, however, that the Commission 
of· F'inance placed reliance upon the language of Section 
82C-2-13, UCA 1943, which prorvides: 
The commission of finance shall prescribe and 
fix a schedule of salaries for the officers, clerks, 
stenographers and employees of state offices, de-
partments, boards and commissions, except where 
such salaries are fixed by statute or by appropri-
ation; and such schedule of salaries shall have. the 
force of law in all state offices, departments, 
boards and commissions, and shall in no case be 
ex~eeded without the express approval . of the 
commission of finance. 
Sections 82C-2-14 and 82C-2~21 also provide: 
The commission of financH shall examine all 
requests for personnel and shall approve or dis-
approve the same and no new position shall be 
created and no vacancy shall be: filled until the 
commission has certified to the department re-
questing the· creation of a new position or the 
filling of the vacancy that the position is neces-
sary to carry on the work of such department in 
an efficient and business-like manner and that the 
necessary funds therefor are available to the 
department. The commission shall investigate · 
the need for every exiS'ting position in every 
department and shall re:port its findings to the 
board of examiners with its recommendations for 
the most effective means of discontinuing unnec-
essary positions. ( 82C-2-14) 
The commission of finance shall exercise ac-
counting control over all state departments and 
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agencies and prescribe the manner and method 
of certifying that flmds are available and ade-
quate to n1eet all contracts and obligations. The 
con1mission shall examine and approve, or dis-
approve, all requisitions and proposed expendi-
tures for the several departments, except salarie~s 
or compensation of officers fixed by law, and no 
requisition of any of the departments shall be 
allowed nor shall any obligation be created with-
-out the approval and certification of the commis-
sion. The commission of finance shall pre-audit 
all claims against the state. The commission of 
finance shall, with the approval of the state audi-
tor as to the adequacy of such documents ill 
facilitating the post-audit of public accounts, pre-
scribe all forms of requisitions, receipts, vouchers, 
bills or claims to be used by the several dep·art-
ments and the forms, procedures, and records to 
be maintained by all departmental, institutional 
or agency store rooms and exercise inventory con-
trol over such store rooms. ( 82C-2-21) 
When the foregoing provisions were first enacted 
question was raised as to their constitutionality.- At-
tached to the Complaint in this case as Exhibits "G", 
"H", "I" and "J" are copies of opinions issued by the 
office of Attorney General under dates of August 6, 
1941, and August 20, 1941, a letter from the Chainnan of 
the Commission of Finance to the Attorney General 
dated August 11, 1941, and excerpts from minutes of_ 
the meeting of the Board of Examiners held November 
19, 1941, in which the question of constitutionality of 
provisions in the Finance Commission Act of 1941 is 
discussed. These documents demonstrate that in 1941 
the Attorney General, the Commission of Finance and 
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the Board of Examiners recognized that some of the 
provisions in the sections quoted above impinged upon 
the constitutional powers and duties of the Board of 
Examiners. The e,xcerpts from minutes of the mee-ting 
of the Board of Examiners held November 19, 1941, very 
clearly show that that Board, in an attempt to remove 
the difficulty, appointed the Commission of Finance as 
it~ .agent to assist the Board of Examiners in the pro-
cessing. of claims. But in making the Commission of 
Finance its agent to assist the Board in the processing 
, 9f such claims the Board of Examiners :rointed out that 
it could not "evade or pass to the Commission of Finance 
its constitutional responsibility." Consequently, the 
Board of Examine_rs specifically, and expressly, reserved 
·"supervisory C()ntrol to the end that if, at any time, the 
procedure should prove inadequate to properly guard 
the public eJCpenditures, the Board may have an oppor-
tunity to correct any irregularity found to exist," and 
the Board added: "This, of course, means that any time 
the Board sees fit to question any commitment at any 
stage of the procedure, it may do so." 
We think the opinions and the le~tter from the Board 
of Examiners to the Commission of Finance. dated No-
vember 19, 1941, clearly indicate that the Board was 
attempting only to constitute the Commission its agent 
to assist in the processing procedure conn~cted with 
claims against the state. The Board did not, and it could 
not, delegate to the Commission of Finance power to 
approve or disapprove claims. That is the constitutional 
power of the Board of Examiners and it could not legally 
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delegate that power to the Commission of Finance, nor 
could the Legislature empower the Commission to p·er-
form such authority. To the extent that Sections 82C-
2-13, 14 and 21 attempt to give the Commission of Fi-
nance power and authority to examine and approve· or 
disapprove clai1ns against the State, we submit that those 
provisions are unconstitutional because they conflict with 
the provisions of Section 13 of Article VII of the Con-
stitution. 
The provision in Section 82C-2-21 that the Commis-
sion "shall examine and appro~e, or disappro~e, all 
requisitions and proposed expenditure's of the several 
departments, except salaries or compensation of officeTs 
fixed by law, and no requisition of any of the depart-
ments shall be allowed nor shall any obligation be created 
without the approval and certification of the commission" 
we submit is directly in conflict with the constitutional 
power of the Board of Examiners to "examine all claims 
against the State except salaries or compensation of 
officers fixed by law." Likewise, we submit that the· pro-
vision in Section 82C-2~13 that the Commis.sion "shall 
prescribe and fix a schedule of salaries * * * except where 
such salaries are fixed by statute or by appropriation" 
and that such schedules of salaries "shall in no case be 
exceeded without the express appro;val of the commission 
of finance" does not and could not take away from the 
Board of Examiners its exclusive constitutional power 
to examine and approve or disapprove salary claims 
against the state, other than those fixed by law. 
It will also be remembered that Chapter 16, as 
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passed "by the Special Session in 1951, specifically author-
ized the ·Board of Education to ''fix" the salary of the 
· Superintendent. It is our contention that this statutory 
power given to the Board of Education was subject only 
to·the constitutional power of the.Board of Examiners. 
If there is a conflict between the provisions of Sec-
tion 82C-2-13 and S·ection 75-7-2, as amended by the 
Special Session, as to the power of "fixing" the salary 
of the Superintendent, then the provisions of Section 
75-7-2 must prevaiL That is the late·rstatute, and under 
well established principles would re~p,eal by implication 
any part of 82C-2-13 in conflict therewith .. Chapte·r 16, 
Laws of· Utah 1951, First Special Session, contains this 
proVision: 
All existing statutes of the state of Utah 
which are inconsistent or in conflict with this act, 
are to the extent of such inconsistency or con-
flict, declared null and void insofar as they relate 
to the provisions of this act.. 
Likewise, to the extent that there is conflict between 
the provisions in Chapter 16 that the Board of Education 
"shall fix the salary of the state superintendent of public 
instruction'' and the pro;visions in Section 87-1-1, as 
amend~d _by Chapter 124, Laws of Utah 1945, the 1951 
act will prevail. Section 87-1-1, as amended, provides : 
The annual salaries of the following state 
officers are fixed as follows : * * * superintendent 
of public instruction, $6,000. 
·In Commonwealth v. Rose, Commissioner, 160 Va. 
177, 168 S.E. 356, the Virginia court had before it a 
48 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
situation not unlike the one before us. There, an act 
had been passed fixing the compensation of commission-
ers of revenue at not to exceed $2500 per year for local 
services to cities. Later the Legislature enacted a neiW 
charter for the city of Riclunond providing that the city 
council "may fix the compensation of the commis·sione:r 
of the revenue for services rendered the city." In hoJd-
ing that the later provision repealed by implication the 
former limitation, the Court said : 
It is not easy to understand how this state-
ment could be misunderstood. To fix compensa-
tion is to name it * * * 
It is said that repeal by implication is not 
favored and that statutes apparently in conflict 
are to be reconciled when possible. These are 
propositions at this late date not questioned; but, 
where the implicatton is inevitable·, it has all the 
force of an express declaration. * * * 
Unless words are smoke screens, a statement 
to the effeet that a city shall not pay its commis-
sioner of revenue more than $2,500, followed by a 
later enactment to the effect that it may fix his 
compensation, leads to the inescapable conclusion 
that the first limitation is sup-erseded. * * * The 
state, by statute, has given to the city in its char-
ter, in words as clear as our language offers, 
power to say what it will pay to its commissioners 
of revenue. That declaration cannot be over-
ridden so long as law requires us to give a plain 
meaning to plain words. 
In the case of Abrams et al., v. La Guardia, Mayor, 
et al., 174 Misc. 421, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 891 (1940), the court 
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held that language authorizing a Board of .Estimate "to 
fi:x: the salaries and compensation of the justices. of the 
municipal court" did not confer a limited power ~ut 
implied ''a·p.Je.i1ary right to act :free from any judicial 
or administrative interference." In construing· a con-
stitutional provision authorizing the legislature to "fix" 
salares of county superintendents of schools the court 
in Woodcock v. Dick (Cal. 1950), 222 P. 2d 667, said: 
The word. "fix" means to determine, to assign 
precisely, to make definite and settled. Webster's 
New Internat. Diet., 2d ed. To fix compensation 
is to prescribe a rul~· or rate by which it is to be 
determine:d. Flagg v. Columbia· County, 51 Or. 
172, 94 P. 184, 186; Anderson's Law Diet. It has 
been held that the power to fix compensation 
include·s the. power to adjust or regulate- and 
implies a plenary right to act by lowering o·r 
raising salaries. * * *. (citing cases) 
We submit that the power of the State Board of 
Education to fix the salary of the Superintendent was 
subject only to the constitutional power of the Board of 
Examiners to examine claims against the State. To the 
·e~tent that any statutes passed prior to Chapter 16 give 
power or authority to the Commission of Finance to fix, 
app:tove or disapp-rove the salary of the Superintendent, 
such provisions were repealed by implication when Chap-
ter 16 became~ law. 
Under the circumstances, the only function of the 
Commission of Finance was to determine whether funds 
were available to pay the salary claims and then to 
process them, and prepare and issue the warrants. 
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CONCLUSION 
We submit that the State Board of Education was 
authorized to appoint Dr. Bateman Superintendent of 
Public Instruction and to fix the salary at $10.000. 
After salary claims 'vere processed and approved by the 
Board of Exruniners the Commission of Finance had 
no legal right to refuse to issue warrants cove·ring those 
claims. A Peremptory 'Vrit should issue comp·ellin.g 
defendants to issue warrants covering salary claims 
properly submitted by and on behalf of Dr. Bateman 
and approved by the Board of Examiners. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. YERNON, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
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